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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Kennan and Human Rights
Gordon A. Christenson
George Kennan, the distinguished historian, scholar, and elder statesman,
recently has reconfirmed and explained his initial assault against dangers
from what he saw as the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to the United States
foreign policy.' Soon after taking leave from the foreign service and moving
to Princeton, Kennan delivered a series of lectures at the University of
Chicago in 1951. Forming the basis of his first book on diplomacy, the lec-
tures concentrated on American diplomacy during the first fifty years of the
.twentieth century.2 Kennan drew extensively upon examples of the use of
supposed idealistic purposes that concealed failure in dealing consciously or
realistically with the dilemmas of substance in the international relations of a
nation thrust into world power.
Surprised in pursuing the contrast between the lucid, realistic thinking
of early American statesmen and the "bombast" of their later successors,
Kennan found a form of utopianism in the rationale and rhetoric of foreign
policy which began after the Civil War and held sway until World War II. He
described this style as "utopian in its expectations, legalistic in its concept of
methodology, moralistic in the demands it seemed to place on others, and
self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to
ourselves." 3 This style found expression in too much reliance upon arbitra-
tion treaties, world disarmament conferences, multilateral treaties outlawing
war such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and illusions about the hope of world
I. George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951), 93. "1 see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something
that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems." Ibid. His
memoirs explain how he came to assemble from extensive notes a polemic against
morality in foreign policy, which remained unfinished until he presumably completed it in
his recent article. George Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963 (Boston: Little Brown, 1967),
71-72; George Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 64 (1985): 205.
2. Kennan, American Diplomacy, note 1 above, 95-103.
3. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, note I above, 71.
345




 , i i i  , 
fir   
t I li ti - ralistic"    it   
l   
, i  i l i it   
.   
i      
r .2   f 
r 
  il  i i i l l ti  f  
    
l i li i i i  
 i  t" t i  l t  , 
i i i  t  ti l   r t ri  f f r i  
 r I.  
l li i i i   
  
 i i i   
3 
i i l i t f , ltil t l tr ti  tl i  
r  s t  ll - ri  ct,  ill si s t t   f orld 
1  , i  i l ,  i : i r it  f i  r , 
), . I  t  t ri  f lt f r t li  f r l ti  t  li  i  t i  
i t ll l li i li i  t  i t ti l r l .  I i . i  
i l i    t  l  f  t i  t   l i  i t 
r lity i  f r i  licy, ic  re ained unfinished until he presu ably co pleted it in 
i  i l , i  -1963 t : ittl  r , ), 
 , lit   r i  li ,  r i  ff ir   ( ): . 
. , ri  i l , t   , - . 
. , ir  -1963, t  1 v , 71. 
 
CHRISTENSON
peace through international organizations such as the League of Nations and
the United Nations. These pretentions and assertions of idealistic purposes,
Kennan thought, concealed a failure of substance in those efforts and
reflected immaturity in those responsible for the foreign policy of the
period.
4
In Kennan's view, the responsibility of governments in foreign policy is
to act from a realistic appraisal of the "national interest." The difficulty of this
kind of calculation is illustrated by the skepticism of David Hume, who ex-
plained that while it is in the interest of nations to have laws of nations and
an obligation for all to obey them, it is not necessarily in the interest of a
single nation to obey them. "What is in the interests of every nation is that
other nations obey them, while it does not." 5 Hume's utilitarian premise,
while not free from criticism, illustrates Kennan's dilemma in calculating the
national interest as if it were in contrast with "moralistic-legalistic" thinking.
That Hume's (and possibly Kennan's) premise may not be valid can be
shown at the outset from the imperatives Kennan himself addresses.
Two great perils, nuclear weapons and destructive changes in the global
ecology (a third may involve the global economy), require an international
regime of cooperation transcending the interests of any single nation-state,
according to Kennan. A moral imperative drives or ought to drive the United
States to address these problems. The reason is that the threat is common to
all and jeopardizes the survival of all, requiring cooperation even if national
sovereignty has to yield to the common interest. On the other hand, Kennan
does not believe that the same moral obligation for governments follows
from the concern for individual human rights in other countries, especially
when it means intruding in the legal and political relationships between
another country and its nationals or residents.
In a system of nation-states each having autonomous soverign power,
the structure necessary for the effective resolution of the twin perils requires
international control or regulation that intrudes into the power of any single
state. Why does Kennan make the case for intrusive international control to
reduce the grave dangers from nuclear and environmental threats, but
choose not to make it for the threats to civilization by the brutalization of
human beings by some of those governments?
Understanding the formulation of this interpretation and the intellectual
basis for Kennan's critique and distinctions reveals the implications of his
realism for a jurisprudence of international human rights.6 Such an inquiry
4. Ibid., 71.
5. Jonathan Harrison, Hume's Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 233.
6. Richard Falk seems to share Kennan's realism in addressing human rights morality from
national perspectives: "[l]t is as revealing as it is disquieting to note that the international
concern of governments for human rights, realized after it became a goal of American
foreign policy at the outset of the Carter presidency, has receded as quickly as it was
stimulated, here and elsewhere." Falk is doubtful whether the contemporary structures of
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Kennan and Human Rights
also requires self-recognition. In Kennan's view, limits within the human pre-
dicament ought to restrain a foreign policy of "moralistic meddling." Like
Butterfield, Kennan is not driven by the moral vision of the City of God or its
utopian secular equivalents to insist that the world be transformed into it.
7
What statesmen wisely can do with the worldly city does not and ought not
depend on the heavenly or utopian vision. St. Augustine thought a Christian
conception of the City of God does not and ought not require that a states-
man impose that vision on the world. As Alberto Coil interprets St.
Augustine's view, dealings among noble pagans in service of the state and
informed by human experience and worldly calculations, even if held to the
possibility of original sin, would ultimately do less harm and less violence
than if a utopian city were brutally imposed.
8
For Kennan, understanding human conditions realistically, choosing
policy prudently, and acting wisely might avoid disaster, or great harm, and
yet lead to unpleasant consequences. He thought the national interest re-
quired intervention in Korea to contain aggression from the north and avert
or deter further propensities for expansion by other aggressive nations. He
also thought it imprudent of MacArthur to push beyond the status quo ante
toward the Yalu River, inviting greater disaster by upsetting the Chinese. The
lives sacrificed, the unpleasant human consequences of the war, were worth
the cost only to a point, Kennan thought. How does a government, in its
foreign policy, handle these kinds of moral dilemmas? Knowing the limits of
the human condition is a beginning. As Kennan explained to the student left
during another, more difficult, dilemma involving the Viet Nam war, a deep-
ened sadness about suffering might replace anger. An acute sense of the
tragic in the human condition might temper brutality. Humor and grace in
power, global and national, can tap the humanizing potential of human rights norms.
Richard Falk, The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations (New
York: Holmes & Meier, 1983), 29-30. Thus he shares Kennan's skepticism about the
claims of human rights diplomacy but for widely divergent reasons. Falk believes that
such advocacy merely reinforces the nation-state system that allows nationalistic goals to
be pursued in their territories so long as they will abide by the most minimal decencies re-
quired by international law. Until structural transformation allows human rights to
become part of a new Grotian global synthesis, the "faddish prominence temporarily ac-
corded human rights diplomacy as a pathetic reenactment of the Grotian quest" will be
overcome by "statist logic." Ibid.
Kennan agrees but proposes to work within the traditional statist system to achieve
precisely what realistically can be achieved in the national interest, "reasonably con-
ceived," with human rights in other countries being of lesser concern. Curiously, they
both agree that two of the most overriding global concerns that nations now face are
nuclear weapons, including the problem of major war, and the massive abuse of the eco-
logical planetary system. These problems are relatively new and require global coopera-
tion as a matter of national self-interest. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1
above, 216-217.
7. Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of History, ed. Adam West (London: Eyre Muthaen,
1981), 181.
8. See Alberto CoIl, The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the Philosophy of.
International Politics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 27-28.
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CHRISTENSON
living without illusion become ways to remain active in the harsh world,
without giving up, even in the face of the consequences of our actions,
refusing the self-righteous vision as justification for ignoring the harm we
may cause to our institutions by destructive protest.9
Though inadequately stated above, this orientation of Kennan to the
world, to his thesis and to his self-knowledge, shapes the inquiry. This essay
seeks understanding of his view of normative thinking in foreign policy,
whether moral or legal, and the implications from the perspective of human
rights in an unfriendly world. It criticizes his conceptual presuppositions to
gain clarity, posing paradoxes and dilemmas regarding their normative qual-
ity within the present structure of international relations.
I. THE CRITICAL-REALIST VIEW OF LAW AND MORALITY
Kennan penned that felicitous phrase, the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to
foreign policy, in his last lecture at Chicago. Hans Morgenthau, himself an
accomplished international lawyer, had earlier laid the intellectual founda-
tions in his unrelenting attack on the legalistic-moralistic approach to inter-
national relations. 10 From the time Kennan made the term popular, it has
become widely known and often misunderstood. The phrase for decades
has been the foil against which international legal scholars in particular have
launched a major defense of the role of international law in foreign policy."
The critical realists identified with Kennan and Morgenthau differ from
the pure "scientific" normativists associated with the theory of Hans
Kelsen. 12 While both the realists and the normativists distinguish political
from moral or legal imperatives, they differ in their view of law and morality.
For Kelsen, the pure norm of law differs conceptually from subjective moral-
ity. For the political realists, both law and morality, at least in the interna-
tional arena, are subjectively normative. Most post-war American legal
9. See in particular Kennan's plea to the student left during the late 1960s, in Democracy and
the Student Left (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), 216, 227.
10. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),
4-15; Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1951), 144 ("legal obligations must yield to the national interest'l.
11. See, for example, Richard Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1968), 257; Richard Falk, The Status of Law in International Society
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 497; and John Moore, "Law and Na-
tional Security," Foreign Affairs 51 (1973): 408. "On one side were international relations
theorists such as Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, who saw only a small role
for international law and who opposed their 'realist' position to what they believed were
dangers of a 'legalistic-moralistic' approach in dealing with national security issues. On
the other side were jurists such as Hardy C. Dillard and Myres S. McDougal, who warned
that the realists had an incomplete understanding of the role of international law and that
their view, if influential, could be costly for American foreign policy." Ibid.
12. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952), 380-386.
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Kennan and Human Rights
scholars have remained centrist and Grotian, allowing moral reasoning to in-
fluence the structure of international law but relying on positive state prac-
tice for evidence of what particular norms exist objectively.13 They have ac-
cepted the realist criticism 14 but have claimed a longer tradition of law as a
limitation or guide to action based upon custom and consent.'5
The Kennan-Morgenthau school of realism in power politics has been
criticized both as contrary to the rule of law and as condoning naked power
in the service of the national interest.16 Kennan's lonely voice was heard
often from his isolation from and disagreement with much of the making and
expression of foreign policy then under way after World War II. He called
for hard analysis of particular interests quite apart from moral posturing made
into universal doctrines for domestic political consumption. He was not
averse to American intervention, for example, for the protection of specific
vital interests, as in the Korean war to repel the attack to the 38th Parallel
(but not to the Yalu). He would first require, however, a rigorous and precise
understanding of national interests. His most biting criticism was saved for
the American penchant for trying to conform behavior of others in the world
to a set of universals drawn from a projected idealistic legal vision. The ex-
amples he used in the Chicago lectures covered the Spanish-American war,
the Open Door policy for China with Hays scolding the wicked Europeans,
the two world wars and the Korean conflict (seeking "victory" over all Korea)
and the events leading to it. Kennan severely challenged this belief structure.
While it seems quaint to us now, philosophical idealism flowering at the
13. See Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," The British Year-
book of International Law 23 (1946): 1.
14. See Falk's conclusion in his review of the work of Kenneth S. Carlston. Falk, The Status of
Law in International Society, note 11 above, 497.
15. Positive international law is traditionally determined by reference to evidence drawn from
state practice, treaties, decisions of international tribunals, general principles of law com-
mon to all nations, and opinio juris from respected publicists.
Representative American international legal scholars holding this view in separating
positive international law from both morality and politics are identified in Francis Boyle,
World Politics and International Law (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 3-57.
For an earlier statement of the English influence, see Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim,
"The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method," American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 2 (1908): 313. Later British positivism is found in Arthur Nussbaum, Concise
History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954); H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 221 (distinguishing international law from
morality); and Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979). Hans Kelsen propounds the clearest conceptual distinction
among these in Principles of International Law note 12 above. See also Wolfgang Fried-
mann, Legal Theory, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 579; Wolfgang
Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1964).
16. See critical comments from students and academics, together with Kennan's response, in
Kennan, note 9 above. Even Myres McDougal, no stranger to the power process, thinks
that political realism made fundamental errors in its lack of comprehensiveness or under-
standing of authority from community expectations. See Falk, note 11 above.
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CHRISTENSON
ime, as symbolized by Josiah Royce at Harvard, was a pervasive influence
tnd was easily associated with utopian legal thinking. It was easy to con-
;truct and destroy such an association, given the emerging American prag-
natism championed by Royce's colleague and rival, William James.
vorgenthau and Kennan obliged.
The dangerous propensities of governments cannot be restrained by a
;ystem of legal rules and limitations in the same way they can be domesti-
-ally where the aggressive instincts of individuals are repressed directly,
<ennan thought.' 7 What was possible for thirteen colonies in a different
jeriod, moreover, might not be possible for nations.' 8 A naive belief in the
•ule of law among nations, if acted on, meant in his estimation that
;tatesmen might and most often would avoid facing the intractable conflicts
n interests of nations by finding some formal criteria to define the permissi-
ile behavior of states juridically. This avoidance operated to conceal the
zonflicts by placing the burden and function of determining outcomes on
'ormal rules or process. Competent judicial bodies or international organiza-
:ions and good offices would measure governmental behavior against those
:riteria and decide whether or not that conduct was acceptable. The objec-
:ive and impartial application of autonomous rules idealistically agreed to
and codified in positive law under the Hague Conventions and others would
narrow conflict and reduce hostility.
The assumption would have to be made, as Kennan pointed out, that
Dther peoples would want to subordinate their own positive aspirations or
ambitions and demands to this abstract and idealistic code of treaty law or
custom for the pacific settlement of international disputes. With proper
submissiveness the destructive manifestations of national ego and aggres-
siveness might be contained or composed by making conflict narrowly less
substantial.' 9 Kennan thought there lay behind this innocence a classic
17. In this conclusion, Kennan agreed with Freud, who in Civilization and its Discontents,
trans. Joan Riviere (New York: J. Cape & H. Smith, 1930) began to explore the collective
social pathologies and to speculate on the taming of the destructive instincts through in-
terpersonal and family psychological arrangements.
18. But see the precise question put in the Constitutional Convention by Patterson of New
Jersey, as chronicled by Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 308. The proposal on sanctions if a state ig-
nored or failed to enforce an Act of Congress was that the Executive should have power
"to call forth the power of the Confederate States... to enforce and compel an obedi-
ence." Hamilton and Madison objected for reasons still compelling in international rela-
tions: "The larger states will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of
it .... It was the cobweb which would entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the
strong." Ellsworth called the proposal "coercion by force." The Convention rejected it by
substituting "coercion by law" whereby the national power would be applied directly to
individuals by judges under the supermacy clause, differing from earlier federal govern-
ments by affording "complete and compulsive operation" on the individual citizen.
19. Roscoe Pound frequently used the term "composition" to mean the termination of a
dispute by an adjustment that might reduce fighting and increase security by buying off
vengeance with compensation, thereby trivializing the conflict. Roscoe Pound, Introduc-
tion to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1922), 74-75, 136.
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Kennan and Human Rights
American avoidance, the denial that other peoples have interests or aspira-
tions more important than the uniquely American, possibly Wilsonian, vi-
sion of world peace. It is implausible to the American mind, according to
Kennan, that other people should have objectives and a vision of order more
important to them than the American dream of international peace and har-
mony. 2
0
American statesmanship, influenced in large part by the legal profes-
sion, is driven by these biases to seek structures for composing international
disputes by agreed criteria called rules that embody the universal ideal.
21
This structural approach to international disputes is an American style that
defers substantive conflict to a later institutionalized process using abstract
doctrine that all appear to accept.
22
In addition to being misguided at home, Kennan believes this American
view of world peace fuels resentment and hostility elsewhere.23 His most re-
cent piece in Foreign Affairs, "Morality and Foreign Policy," explains why
worldly national interests, reasonably conceived, not moral judgments
about the goodness or wickedness of behavior of other nations, ought to be
the guiding principle in the making and execution of foreign policy. He
writes in the Butterfield tradition:
It would be a policy that would seek the possibilities for service to morality
primarily in our own behavior, not in our judgment of others. Itwould restrictour
undertakings to the limits established by our own traditions and resources. It
would see virtue in our minding our own business wherever there is not some
overwhelming reason for minding the business of others. Priority would be given,
here, not to the reforming of others but to the averting of the two apocalyptic ca-
tastrophes that now hover over the horizons of mankind.
24
In this separation of morality from realistic national interests, Kennan
has long associated the legal with the moral. He does not distinguish interna-
tional law from morality in his critique. It is unclear whether Kennan would
make such a distinction if he thought about it, and thus merely describes an
association others make, or if he would agree with others that the two can-
not be separated. In either case he would see that this association contains
dangers. By linking moralistic with legalistic thinking, a foreign policy sets in
motion a propensity to carry into the affairs of states notions of right and
20. Kennan, American Diplomacy, note 1 above, 94.
21. Seven of the eight U.S. Secretaries of State from 1898 to 1920 were lawyers, among whom
were John Sherman, William Rufus Day, John Hay, Elihu Root, William Jennings Bryan,
and Robert Lansing. Undersecretaries or legal advisers included James Brown Scott, J.
Reuben Clark, Jr., and John Bassett Moore, all influential on both positive international
law and foreign policy.
22. In present jargon, no structural approach is possible without dealing at some point with
the hidden preferences entailed in the deep structures of systems of order, as Marx sought
to understand.
23. A recent account and appraisal of the Reagan doctrine may be found in Stephen S.
Rosenfeld, "The Guns of July," Foreign Affairs 64 (1986): 698.
24. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1 above, 217-218.
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CHRISTENSON
wrong, "the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judg-
ment." 2 This conclusion flows from a different kind of prior morality, the
moral obligation to obey the law. Those who invoke a law thus might feel
moral superiority to the lawbreaker.
Kennan's view of domestic law clearly rests on a moral obligation to
obey the law if one is accepting its protection and advantage.26 When ap-
plied to state behavior inappropriately, as Americans often do, such moral
indignation over another country's illegal actions can easily spill over into
legal sanctions, or military contest.27 Now backed by military force, the
claim "knows no bounds short of the reduction of the lawbreaker to the
point of complete submissiveness- namely, unconditional surrender." Mili-
tary coercion in the name of right easily leads to some form of domination, a
paradox for international law. While rooted in a hope for doing away with
war and violence, the legalistic approach to world affairs "makes violence
more enduring and destructive to political stability than did the older
motives of national interest." 28 Far greater in moral virtue would be a United
States that maintained integrity and consistency in its own domestic morality
and in its calculation of foreign policy from interests more narrowly fash-
ioned from national security and national well-being.
2 9
Whatever the intellectual validity of Kennan's own appraisal of the role
of law in international relations and its connection, if any, to morality, his
position has been consistent and coherent over the years.30 It rests on ex-
plicit assumptions that partake of a rich Western intellectual tradition, from
St. Augustine to Machiavelli and, beyond, to the political realists such as But-
25. Kennan, American Diplomacy, note 1 above, 98.
26. Kennan, note 9 above, 167-170. "The central function of government, as I see it, is the
assurance of the public order. This is something for which nobody has ever found any
suitable means that do not include, at some point, the devices of coercion. This is true of
the democracy as it is of the dictatorship. Whoever relies on these devices - on the police
and the courts and the prisons-as instruments for the assurance of his own protection
and his own enjoyment of civil rights - has no moral basis, as I see it, for denying his con-
tribution to their maintenance." Ibid., 169.
27. For example, the Reagan military response of April 1986 against Libya for exporting
revolutionary violence was justified on the basis of self-defense.
28. Kennan, American Diplomacy, note 1 above, 98-99. For a recent expression of the pro-
pensity to convert a moral position in foreign policy into a compulsion to prevail, see
Rosenfeld, note 23 above, 713: "Moral considerations and the political pressures they
generate will keep pushing the President toward escalating and trying to win" (in the low-
cost support of anti-communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and
Angola).
29. Alan Tonelson, "The Real National Interest," Foreign Policy 61 (1985-86): 49; Christopher
Layne, "The Real Conservative Agenda," Foreign Policy 61 (1985-86): 73. Layne rejects
both universalism and crusading ideological internationalism, while supporting the realist
tradition of Robert Taft, Dwight Eisenhower, and George Kennan in resisting the promo-
tion of human rights and support of international organizations as major elements of U.S.
foreign policy.
30. Serious criticism continues. For criticism from a positive international law perspective, see
Boyle, note 15 above, 3-57.
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Kennan and Human Rights
terfield and Morgenthau. Especially now that Kennan's warning is heard
once again, when the place of international law in foreign policy seems in
decline in influence and respect in recent years, a clearer look at a few cen-
tral ideas seems urgent.3
1
II. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND MORALITY
George Kennan never has developed explicitly a studied position on the use
of human rights norms in foreign policy. His writings are replete, however,
with specific conclusions and examples warning against projecting domestic
conceptions of a morality that seems to underpin much of the human rights
movement. Sometimes he refers to human rights documents and the Hel-
sinki Final Act.32 His analysis based on national interests' predominating
morality or legality repeats his Chicago lectures' theme. Human rights inter-
ventions or interferences by one state in the domestic affairs of another are
based on a displaced universalism encroaching into the relations of govern-
ments with their own nationals.
The international human rights movement, which Kennan applauds
when private, has increased its pressure on government policy. This fact,
Kennan agrees, has to be considered in foreign policy decisions, but only
because public opinion requires attention for domestic political consump-
tion and not because the nation has any obligation to act according to a
moral code in relation to other governments.33 Nowhere, to my knowledge,
does Kennan ask whether it may be in the national interest to use human
rights initiatives as an instrument of foreign policy in more sophisticated
ways to help a people find a more humane alternative than repressive gov-
ernment from either the left or the right and thereby avoid the kind of polar-
31. While Kennan has not repudiated his intellectual position separating political realism
from legality and morality, as Hans Morgenthau arguably did before his death, he has
come close to adopting a utopian plea in preventing nuclear war based on an approach of
self-interest using the international law and organization model. The Morgenthau story as
well as a rigorous criticism of the realists' metaphysical construction of the "legalistic-
moralistic" approach they then deconstruct appears in Boyle, note 15 above, 70.
32. George Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), 154, 212-214;
Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1 above.
33. For recent attempts to apply concepts of basic human rights and morality to foreign policy
issues, see Stanley Hoffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of
Ethical International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981); Richard
Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980); Jack
Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law,
Morality and Politics," Journal of International Affairs 37 (1984): 311-328; Robert
Matthews and Cranford Pratt, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles and Canadian
Practice," Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 159; David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The
Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald
Reagan," Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 205; and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Establishing a
Viable Human Rights Policy," World Affairs 143 (1981): 323.
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CHRISTENSON
ized reaction that places the United States in a dilemma. 4 This reasoning
leads to a consideration of the explicit separation of morality from the inter-
national law of human rights as well as from foreign policy."
The first consideration in light of Kennan's association of legalistic with
moralistic thinking is whether there is any conceptual difference between in-
ternational human rights law (I here assume that it qualifies as international
law) and human rights morality.36 If there is such a distinction, does it make
any difference? If one means that, with John Austin, all international law is
positive morality only, then the difference is without meaning. The imple-
mentation of human rights policy in domestic law by sovereign states would
not be obligatory in either case. A human rights foreign policy as morality
would be suspect. If one distinguishes positive international law from moral-
ity, as Hart does, however, might that conceptual difference have opera-
tional effect on the behavior of governments if human rights law formed part
of a nation's foreign policy? The distinction might make a difference in how it
relates to the foreign policy of the United States, for a claim that positive in-
ternational law is part of foreign policy is in effect an auto-limitation on the
state, too.3 7 If foreign policy is based on positive international law, including
justification for counterintervention to aid a democratic regime or insur-
gency,38 might Kennan's objections be answered? If morality influences law
and law foreign policy, would it make any difference? Wouldn't the question
be an empirical one: What are the expectations of the international com-
munity?
A second consideration deals with Kennan's argument about an inner
morality of duty, of responsibility for the effective use of national resources
and restraint in action that will best serve real national interests. Part of this
kind of morality is the reciprocity of acting in such a way that rivals will not
34. A recent shift toward a more even-handed use of human rights rhetoric in foreign policy
by the United States in such a direction can be seen in President Reagan's message to
Congress of 15 March 1986. "Freedom, Regional Security and Global Peace, Presidential
Message to Congress," New York Times, 15 March 1986, p. 4.
35. For a thorough examination of both the moral and political considerations of human
rights in foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Reaching for the Most Difficult: Human
Rights as a Foreign Policy Goal," Daedalus 112 (1983): 19 (recommending a normative use
of international human rights in the foreign policy of liberal-democratic states as a strategy
based on both moral and political reasons for transforming a nation-state system into an
international system of states that respect human rights).
36. Henkin clearly distinguishes between law and morality both in the international system
and in United States domestic law, in his article, "International Human Rights and Rights
in the United State," in Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), 25. The distinction between international law and morality
generally is considered by H. L. A. Hart, note 15 above, 221-226 (no necessary relation-
ship between a sense of moral obligation of states and the existence of international law
or the motivation to adhere to it).
37. See Boyle, note 15 above, 58, for an argument that in effect converts the auto-limitations
and nihilism of positivism into a functional approach.
38. Cutler, "The Right to Intervene," Foreign Affairs 64 (1985).
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Kennan and Human Rights
use one's actions against one's national interests. Another part of this ques-
tion is a nation's responsibility for the consequences of the effects of its
foreign policy used to change human rights conditions in other countries.
Kennan considers it morally reprehensible for a policy to demand human
rights reforms within specific countries but to assume no responsibility for
the human consequences (if conditions actually worsen) because the cost of
further intervention is too high or the will is missing.
39
That Kennan is a political realist in the tradition of Machiavelli, Hobbes,
Bentham, and other Europeans is scarcely a revelation. A foreign policy of
realism of interests in a world dominated by the sovereign nation-state is a
fact of life, not likely to change in the foreseeable future. The traditions of
philosophical realism and logical positivism or legal realism and legal
positivism, each of which also separates a kind of "is" of reality from an
"ought" of ontology or of a more just world, have not occupied as much of
Kennan's attention as thinking clearly about distinguishing the moral from
the political in international relations.
40
Kennan's theoretical assumptions about the political realism he uses in
thinking about foreign policy in human rights can be adapted to diplomacy
without projecting moralistic self-righteousness. Idealizing a merged moral
39. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1 above, 210. "We are demanding, in effect,
a species of veto power over those of their practices that we dislike, while denying respon-
sibility for whatever may flow from the acceptance of our demands." Ibid.
40. Not having studied law in the United States (his academic study of law was in Germany),
Kennan did not have available (I can find no reference to it in his writings) that body of
emerging critical thought called legal realism which makes precisely the same, although
more penetrating, critique of domestic legalisms as he makes in the international sphere.
One of the most lucid works of that period of legal realism is Felix S. Cohen,
"Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," Columbia Law Review 35
(1935): 809. Kennan studied in Germany in the 20s, when the great German legal tradi-
tion of the historical school was influential. The legal positivists of the Vienna circle were
then emerging in Europe to attempt a normative science distinct from morality to match
the analytical and radical empirical thinking then challenging idealism by Russell,
Wittgenstein, and Ayer. See Alfred Jules Ayer, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Random House, 1982), 108-140 for an account of the times.
Were Kennan to study law in the 1980s in America, he might find illuminating an
emerging post-realist and post-structuralist American legal criticism. Thinkers in this tradi-
tion in law faculties use deconstruction and demystification discourse about legal doc-
trine drawn from various European intellectuals in ways surprisingly similar to Kennan's
own critique in exposing the avoidance of the substantive conflict or contradiction in for-
mal criteria for resolving major international disputes. For an excellent comparative
review of legal realism and critical legal studies, see Twining, "Talk About Realism," New
York University Law Review 60 (1985): 329.
H. L. A. Hart credits Bentham for the first critical demystification of the law to show that
laws are simply "commands or prohibitions or permissions to act or to forbear to act. But
this fundamentally imperative character of law is, according to Benthamn, 'clouded and
concealed from ordinary apprehension' by an illusion that there are laws which are not
imperative at all." H. L. A. Hart, "The Demystification of the Law," in Essays on Bentham,
Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 23.
Kennan's demystification of the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to foreign policy might be
viewed similarly, as a recognition of the role of power for effective law.
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tnd political order is a psychological operation. It arises from the denial of
iarsh realities of outrageous acts against human beings such as official tor-
.ure or brutalizing violence seen regularly on television or the horror of
hinking about a nuclear annihilation. It arises, too, from the avoidance of
aking responsibility for substantive decisions that do not fit into the vision of
world order projected from national perspectives. The Truman doctrine (to
iid free governments opposing communist domination, especially Greece
and Turkey), the Nixon doctrine (to aid friendly regimes against externally
;ponsored subversion), the Reagan doctrine (to sponsor insurgencies against
vlarxist, Third World regimes) 41 and similar pronouncements of policy, all
est on the undue influence of legalistic-moralistic intellectual attitudes that
:)ut responsibility for determining results on "doctrine," a form of deferral or
Jenial of political realism, according to Kennan. This excessively self-
"ighteous national egocentrism harms the long-term national and common
nterests. It denies the reality of the world as it is, seeking to coerce it into
conformity with right. It confuses tough moral actions based on the obliga-
:ion or duty to act to prevent or ameliorate basic deprivations of human
-ights in other countries (as in sanctions against them seeking to change in-
:ernal behavior or in supporting insurgent movements to overthrow unjust
:otalitarian regimes)4 2 with hard appraisals and actions necessary for the na-
41. Rosenfeld, note 23 above. "The Reagan Doctrine goes over to the offensive. It upholds
liberation, the goal of trying to recover communist-controlled turf for freedom. In theory,
its reach is universal. In practice, the places to which the Reagan Doctrine has been ap-
plied are a particular set of Third World countries where the Marxist grip is relatively re-
cent and therefore presumably light. This puts Ronald Reagan firmly in the older
American anti-communist tradition of Woodrow Wilson, who, preaching noninterven-
tion, put American troops ashore at Archangel and Vladivostok. That effort to strangle the
Russian Revolution conferred a Wilsonian pedigree on subsequent attempts to undo
Marxist regimes." Ibid., 699. Ideologically, the Reagan doctrine challenges the Brezhnev
doctrine, supporting the socialist legal obligation to come to the aid of communist regimes
under counter-revolutionary attack, and attempts to demonstrate that it can be reversed.
42. Consider this merged moral and political justification in the context of Nicaragua. Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (formerly Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights) gives an archetypic expression in his public defense
of the United States support of the contras in their attempt to overthrow the Sandinista
government: A central justification is "our moral responsibility to the people of Nicaragua,
who fought so hard to win their freedom, only to see their revolution betrayed by a small
band of Marxist-Leninists .... In Nicaragua, our moral goals and our security interest are
identical: Democracy in Nicaragua will reinforce democracy throughout Central
America, while a totalitarian regime in Nicaragua threatens those fragile democracies.
Thus, the only sensible policy is to continue and increase the pressure on the Sandinistas
to accede to the wishes of the Nicaraguan people-for democracy, for freedom and for
peace." Abrams, "Keeping Pressure on the Sandinistas," New York Times, 13 January
1986, p. 15, cols. 2-5.
Stanley Hoffmann similarly opposes the nineteenth century brand of liberalism of John
Stuart Mill that was unreservedly anti-interventionist abroad, but for different reasons. He
gives moral and political arguments in favor of intervention "within very strict limits" for
carefully tailored ends, fully recognizing the possibility for abuses leading to actual harm
for the victims whose autonomy is sought. His moral argument is that a policy of interven-
HeinOnline  -- 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 356 1986
.156 RISTENSON 
m  liti l r  ti .  i   i l f 
l   tr s t i   ffi i l 
m r li i  i l  l l  i r t  rr r f 
i    i . t t ,   f 
i ilit  r i i  t t  t fit i t   f 
'N rl r j t  fr  i l  i   
l   t  t i ti n, i l  
,m ), i  i i ly 
: r i ),  ri   i  i t 
,\I1arxi t ir    41 ts  ll 
'   f l li ti - r li ti  i  t 
J t r r i i g l i ,"   l  
:l i l ,  . i  
'ighte t i   l -t r  ti l   
t . i  rl   ,  i t  
,: f r it    l 
      
" i i t   i
l  t ts  t 
l i   42  l  
. . e i   t  t  ff i . It l  
l   i t- tro led f .   
i l.  i  t i    -
 l   ir  rld  t i i l i l
t  l  i . l i l i  t  l r 
i  i t  il  i  i t -
, l l . t l   
l   tt t  t   
." , . l i ll t i  ll  t  r  
ti   i  i t i  
 t   i  . 
i lli t 
 t t  f  I t rican ff i  (f r rl  i t t 
  i i i  i  li  f  
  i i  
l l i  
 f t  r  t  i  t ir fr , l  t   t ir r l ti  tr  y  s ll 
 i t i i t  .. I  i r , r r l l   r rit  i t r t r  
 i   t t t l 
, i t  il i . 
li i  i i  t    t  i i t  
i i l f  , f r fr   f r 
i  i i  r  i ,   
, . , l . - . 
t   li li  f  
i i i i i t f  iff t r .  
i  l  liti l r t  i  f r f i t r ti  " it i  r  tri t li it " f r 
t il , l i t  t l r  
i l t i  t t  li  f i t r -
Kennan and Human Rights
tional interest as in a clear policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons. 43 Sanc-
tions or punishments against aberrent conduct of other governments not in
harmony with the national vision of peace and order are confused with deci-
sions based upon knowledge of the world of power and its control. If hard
analysis of interests shows that human rights interventions are powerful alter-
natives to polarized internal political and military struggles in friendly dicta-
torships, foreign policy initiatives carefully crafted can prevent an untenable
alliance with a repressive regime while being on the politically "correct" side
of an internal struggle for power. Kennan would argue that unless the in-
terventions were effective, they could do more harm than good by
unleashing unforeseen consequences or loosening internal structures of
authority for keeping order, leading to polarized internal struggle with no
option but greater military force.
tion "would aim not only at spreading the benefits of liberal democracies, but also at over-
coming the antimony between what has been called 'the morality of states' (based on the
principle of state autonomy and on the mutual recognition of a range of states' rights) and
a cosmopolitan morality that subordinates these rights to the human rights of individuals
and groups." Hoffmann, note 35 above, 36-37.
Kennan's critique implies disagreement with both views for the very reason that they are
difficult to distinguish. The temptation is to confuse rhetorically Hoffmann's view that
"noninterventionism abandons the victims of illiberal regimes to their masters" with
Abrams' justification of moral duty for ideological reasons of state morality (Hoffmann
calls it moral Manichaeism) See Kennan, note 32 above, 44, for his view that the selection
in foreign policy decisions of countries in which the concern "for other people's liberties"
finds expression, is arbitrary and hence suspect. But note his views of the responsibility of
governments for consequences of foreign policy interventions for human rights reasons
that might place a burden on, for example, the United States to the extent that its human
rights policy was responsible for weakening the traditional forms of government permit-
ting the rise of repressive regimes and more serious victimization of human beings than its
policy foresaw. Kennan offers imperative arguments of his own. Kennan, "Morality and
Foreign Policy," note I above, 212-217.
43. Kennan was probably the first to advocate and explain a U.S. policy against the first use of
nuclear weapons. See Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, note I above, 110: "Considering
such weapons to be suicidal in their ultimate implications, destructive in a degree which
no purely national objectives could ever justify, and wholly unsuitable as instruments of
national policy, I had always opposed the basing of our defense posture upon them, and
particularly the adoption of the principle of their 'first use' in any major military en-
counter. I had pleaded in vain, only two years before, against the decision to proceed to
the development of the hydrogen bomb before at least renouncing the principle of 'first
use' and then having another try at international negotiations looking to the outlawing of
these and all other weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction." He argued that competi-
tion of indefinite duration in weapon development would not be in the national interest,
driven by the "false mathematics of relative effectiveness" of the inflexible Pentagon think-
ing that became an absolute value. Ibid., 111. His postion was developed as he was leav-
ing the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department in 1949, but it was a personal posi-
tion only. Contrary to what many contemporary critics of the no "first use" policy believe,
Kennan's thinking was not soft (identified with moral wishes) but was based on a hard-
headed analysis of political realism and an assessment of confusion in using nuclear
weapons for defensive purposes, ensuring a policy of their first use regardless of "whether
they had been or might be used against us, in any major military encounter." George
Kennan, Memoirs 1900-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), 472-473.
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CHRISTENSON
Nothing is as simply understood from the standpoint of Kennan's criti-
cism of the effects of this confusion as official human rights positions of the
national government, manifested in the Helsinki Accords, in tying most-
favored nation treatment to Jewish emigration, in conditioning aid on coun-
try reports showing progress in eliminating gross human rights deprivations,
and in seeking democratization in Third World countries. Each of these posi-
tions is an official act meant to detect and correct variances from the national
moral vision projected onto the world in order to transform it. This vision is
not sufficiently driven by political realism and fails because it appears to be
tough when it is naive. Each action in part is ineffective because it uses
power for a moralistic vision which governments have no proper mandate to
impose and because it engenders hostility and awkwardness in relations
with other countries. Moreover, it dissipates vital national energy and re-
sources best marshalled for more strategic and focused policies.
III. KENNAN'S STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Kennan frames his analysis and appraisal using three conceptual presupposi-
tions. The first distinguishes between the behavior of governments and that
of individuals or peoples, the well-known problem of dualism. 44 Only gov-
ernments are responsible for foreign policy. They may choose to be influ-
enced by private moral considerations of public opinion, and are bound by
valid domestic law, but their responsibility is of a wholly different order. Sec-
ond, the moral obligations of governments, or their commitments, differ
from those of individuals. This problem of dual morality is also well known.45
Government's primary obligation is to represent the national interests, not its
moral impulses. These interests are military security, political integrity, and
the well-being of its people. They arise from the very existence of national
sovereignty and are necessary to national existence. These needs are neither
good nor bad. They simply are. No moral justification for acting on the basis
of those interests is needed. No moral reproach for actions in furtherance of
them is required. No moral obligation to other governments arises except to
concede the same legitimate interest in national security for their own peo-
ple and, with rival powers, to understand their intentions and capabilities
reciprocally.
The third general clarifying point Kennan makes is that there are no in-
ternationally accepted standards of morality which governments could in-
voke even if they ought to behave morally. There are certain high-sounding
words and phrases that most governments readily accept when asked. Sub-
44. Lauterpacht, note 13 above.
45. ibid.
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Kennan and Human Rights
scribing to the carries no danger of curtailing freedom of action, because
they are so vague or ambiguous. While Kennan does not mention the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights or the four human rights treaties that
President Carter signed and sent to the Senate for advice and consent to rati-
fication, nor any other of the international or regional machinery set up for
handling human rights disputes, it is a fair conclusion that these agreements
fall into this category for Kennan's purposes of analysis. 46 He does include in
the pronouncement category the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Atlantic Charter,
the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and preambles of many interna-
tional agreements. He also relegates to this category the human rights provi-
sions of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, and presumably the treaties of human
rights binding on the parties referred to in the Final Act.47 While signatory
governments might be held to specific obligations, these international in-
struments use words and phrases that have different meanings for different
people and are but another example of using the Accords to hold others to
United States or Western political and moral standards.
45
Kennan's criticism of the use of vague generalities in various foreign
policy initiatives reflects his realism about the relativity of values in diverse
cultures, not any inherently amoral personal philosophy.49 Indeed, Kennan's
own moral positions are highly developed. While not explicitly saying so, he
suggests that there are moral bases for the nation-state system itself- namely,
in the practical way to keep order most effectively; in the independence of
the diverse national cultures that provide protection for and expect alle-
46. The Helsinki Final Act, which Kennan views with skepticism, refers to many human rights
agreements. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Helsinki Accords) signed I August 1975, Department of State Bulletin 37 (1975):
323-350, reprinted in Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., Human Rights
Documents: Compilation of Documents pertaining to Human Rights, 229-282, and re-
printed in International Legal Materials 14 (1975): 1292-1325.
47. Helsinki Final Act, note 46 above.
48. For a complete history of the Soviet-bloc view of human rights agreements as "different
concepts" for different social systems, see Farrokh Jhabvala, "The Soviet-Bloc's View of
the Implementation of Human Rights Accords," Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 461.
Confirming Kennan's conclusions, whether the agreements are legally binding or are
declarations, Jhabvala shows how the Soviet-bloc governments' view theoretically and in
practice allows them to claim full compliance while resisting internal accountability in-
voking the U.N. Charter respecting the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of states. In-
deed, under Soviet theory of international law, Western liberal conceptions can be used
as the instruments to attack the internal economic and social conditions in countries
where liberation movements are encouraged while also resisting Western interventions to
stop or reverse such movements.
The contradiction between international human rights and cultural relativism is fully ex-
plored in Allison Renteln, "The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Conse-
quences for Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 7 (1985): 514, and in Jack Donnelly,
"Cultural Relativity and Universal Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 6 (1984): 400.
49. These dilemmas are a theme of Clarence Crane Brinton, A History of Western Morals
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959), 10-11.
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CHRISTENSON
giance from citizens; and in the resistance to the implications of a single
world order.5 0
Kennan distinguishes between morality of nations in the external arena,
where sovereign states play out their national interests cooperatively and
competitively, and morality of individuals within a national society in their
relationship to the state and each other. David Hume made the same dis-
tinction.5' Kennan's sense of a citizen's duty to obey the law rests on three
Hobbesian qualities that Kennan accepts as the basis for law in a national
system. First, the social contract forms the theoretical basis for order. It pro-
vides state protection for citizens against the brutish war of each against all in
exchange for their obedience to law and government.52 Second, states as
well as individuals exist in a natural condition of hostility. Without the pro-
tection of a state in return for the obligation to obey, the citizen would be
vulnerable to this hostility from other states.53 This assumption shapes
Kennan's skeptical view of international codes of conduct and his suspicion
about the use of vague and high-sounding declarations, presumably includ-
ing various human rights declarations and covenants, which have no means
of success in a hostile world except through the state. Third, law is the com-
mand of Leviathan to a political inferior backed by threats to maintain inter-
nal peace.
54
Given his acceptance of the social contract, Kennan believes that if one
is to have the security and well-being of a system of government under law,
one is bound by tacit if not actual consent or estoppel to obey the law as a
50. For a coherent explanation for this position in the views of a historian closely allied to
Kennan's realism, see Coll, note 8 above, 5.
51. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), 567-569.
52. Kennan, note 9 above, 169-170.
53. Ibid., 169-170. "No one has a moral right to deny on principle his contribution to [the na-
tional defense] ... unless he is willing to condemn not just the war his government is at
the moment conducting, but every one that it has conducted in the past, including that
which established its political independence; and unless he is really prepared to commit
its destinies to the good graces of an extremely jealous and largely hostile outside world. If
all were to do this, there would of course then be nothing to prevent the seizure of the
reins of government in this country, entirely or in part, by any foreign political entity that
wished to seize them and could accommodate its action to the interests of other foreign
governments." Ibid.
54. Developed later by Bentham and Austin, this notion describes the realistic allocation or
assumption of power within a state. Constitutive in character through yielding freedom for
security and partly informal, this concept seems to form the basis for Kennan's fierce sup-
port of the power allocated to the American judiciary. Shaped in the McCarthy era when
the political branches brought enormous power to bear on Kennan's associates in the
State Department and elsewhere, his preferences favor the principled reason of the in-
dependent judiciary under the Constitution as a safeguard. In that sense, the judiciary is a
political superior. He distrusts the mob-instinct fueled by popular fear of the communist
threat brought on by naive and dangerous mistakes in foreign policy. Kennan, Memoirs
1950-1963, note 1 above; Kennan, note 9 above, 203: "It is better, as I see it, to live under
bad laws fairly and impartially administered than to live under good ones for the proper
application of which no adequate judicial sanction exists, just as it is better to have nar-
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Kennan and Human Rights
moral premise.55 It is unclear whether he would agree with Hume's devasta-
tion of the social contract basis for the duty to obey government and ulti-
mately agree with Hume that self-interest and advantage form the moral
basis to obey, a utilitarian judgment.56 It is also a fair question whether this
moral stance itself conceals a conflict between a pure power theory of law as
command of political superior to political inferior backed by coercion and
that of a natural law, or religiously derived, theory of the justification for the
obligation to obey law.57 In calling for an American outlook that accepts
"obligations of maturity" in a world of relative and changing values, Kennan
admonishes Americans to be grown up, to "put away childish things" that
are so dangerous in such a world.
58
In the arenas of foreign policy, where sovereign states still control the ef-
fective monopoly of coercive power over individuals, Kennan's view of law
is clearly positivist and relativist, based upon mutually enforceable specific
"obligations" derived from consent, presuming common interests.59 In the
rower rights guaranteed by independent courts than wider ones against the arbitrary
denial or curtailment of which there is no judicial recourse." For Kennan, these are
distinctly realistic and legitimate claims, with order and security the predominate values,
whose purpose is aimed at protecting human beings in return for allegiance to the state
through law and the courts.
55. We find this internal premise stated explicitly and defended most vigorously in Kennan's
dialogue with the student left in the late 1960s over the issues of civil disobedience in the
face of the war in Viet Nam, with which he profoundly disagreed. Kennan, note 9 above.
Other statements in his memoirs, books, and articles confirm this moral premise underly-
ing his political theory of government. But see Michael Reisman, "The Tormented Con-
science: Applying and Appraising Unauthorized Coercion," Emory Law Journal 32 (1983):
499 for a psychological consideration of the use of unauthorized violence from Plato's
Crito to modern civil disobedience. For a contemporary critique of the obligation to obey
the law, see Jonathan Raz, "The Obligation to Obey the Law," in The Authority of Law
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), 233.
56. Harrison, note 5 above, 190-191, referring to Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature and
concluding that government is a useful human institution which can retain its usefulness
only if it is usually obeyed and not because the people gave promise a long time ago or,
by acquiescence, made a tacit bargain today. The obligation to obey more accurately
means that one is obliged to obey from the advantage of having order and security.
Kennan's rhetoric refers to the duty to obey almost as a moral imperative, not as a utilitar-
ian calculation of advantage, but his reasoning and analysis address the interests of advan-
tage in having a useful institution.
57. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
58. G. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little Brown, 1961),
397-398. These things include "self-idealization and the search for absolutes in world af-
fairs." A strong nation wielding great power must share in the guilt of exercising that
power when it affects others. "There is no greater American error than the belief that
liberal institutions and the rule of law relieve a nation of the moral dilemma involved in
the exercise of power. Power, like sex, may be concealed and outwardly ignored, and in
our society it often is; but neither in the one case nor in the other does this concealment
save us from the destruction of our innocence or from the confrontation with the dilem-
mas these necessities imply. When the ambivalence of one's virtue is recognized, the total
iniquity of ones' opponent is also irreparably impaired." Ibid.
59. Kennan does not treat seriously the claim that human rights law is a part of international
law that is enforced in external relations by reciprocal sanctions by states, as D'Amato
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human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords, the moral question for
Kennan is not whether the treatment of human beings inside the Soviet
Union sometimes is odious, but why the United States pressed for principles
its statesmen knew could not be met without a complete transformation of
power within the Soviet Union. 60 In this comment, Kennan reveals another
structural basis for his own morality, auto-limitation. Again and again in his
own foreign policy recommendations, Kennan counsels self-limitation and
sacrifice as principles guiding conduct of the United States. Negative impera-
tives restrain the tendency for moral histrionics at the expense of substance
and limit the instinct for covert operations. 61 Positive imperatives are urgent
to gain control over the efficient and effective use of all our resources (the
deficits, for example) and to concentrate these in averting the twin perils,
major war and abuse of the natural habitat of the environment.
62
While surely strategic, control over and concentration of resources and
policy have structural implications, for the perils are so formidable that the
cooperation of states is imperative. The structural modifications are not com-
prehensive, as in supranationalism or world federalism. They are, nonethe-
less, at least functional. These structural imperatives are not only founded on
the rational calculation of advantage, but they also entail "moral obligation,"
to pursue the functions of survival, a common enterprise. A subjective or
religious bias may form an inward duty to a higher purpose.
In the calculation of external advantage in foreign policy, on the other
hand, Kennan seems to discount morality, even though actions taken to
identify and further those interests may reflect internal moral opinion as real-
istic parts of the calculus. He resembles the empiricists and utilitarians fol-
lowing Hume and Bentham, in that sentiments of people merely form part of
a realistic assessment. We choose action to reflect national interest in par-
ticular ways without accepting the Kantian moral imperative to act such that
the basis for action is a principle of universal legislation. Yet Kennan himself
accepts a very disciplined set of inner standards: "Morality," he writes, "if not
principled, is not really morality." 63 The inward moral obligation arises in the
prudent use of power and resources limited to carefully determined national
interests, reasonably conceived, within our own traditions, not in interven-
tions in the vague name of human rights, fidelity to treaties, the United Na-
cogently argues. Anthony D'Amato, "The Concept of Human Rights in International Law,"
Columbia Law Review 82 (1982): 1110. However, Kennan's position does not preclude an
inner incorporation, the possibility that "[h]uman rights law may be used to express the
larger community's expectations even between a country and its own nationals, that rela-
tionship being a juridical construct of international law that may be reflected in domestic
constitutional law." Gordon Christenson, "Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Analyses," University of Cincinnati Law Review 52 (1983): 5-6.
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Kennan and Human Rights
tions Charter, or democracy based on some moral duty to detect and cor-
rect abuse.
Kennan's structure of concepts separates government from individuals.
A structure of governance relationships, both domestic and international,
must be distinguished from the morality of codes of behavior for other
governments' treatment of their citizens. Even the treatment of one's own
citizens rests on a relative morality, the moral and cultural traditions inform-
ing the particular internal political structures of that state. Julius Stone
associates this difference of treatment with diverse "human justice constitu-
encies." 64 Kennan accepts the nation-state system with this explicit dualism,
a constitutive structure resting on worldly presuppositions ultimately norma-
tive. Since states are diverse enclaves of justice, the nation-state system
which protects that variety while serving the needs of human justice might
be said to rest on a moral foundation. 65
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Kennan's postulates allow us to construct an approximation of his concep-
tual position that might undergird the use of human rights norms in foreign
policy. His conservative theories about the state and government, his associ-
ation of law and morality, his critical political realism for statecraft in exer-
cising the power of government, and his view of duty, are all derived from
these postulates. He is explicit in the importance he attaches to his personal
religious values which influence his thinking, but he tries to keep personal
preference separate from his calculation of the requirements of national in-
terests, accepting cultural relativism as a basis for deference to other political
systems. He attempts no "deep-structure" critique of the foundation of the
nation-state system, but accepts the reality of what exists and seeks to further
the national and common interests as he sees them, using the traditional
power of governments. Yet he is highly critical of universal structures, espe-
cially the American penchant for detecting and correcting aberrant behavior
of foreign governments using high-sounding principles most closely
associated in recent years with human rights conventions.
Law as a coercive order made applicable to individuals is best devel-
oped under a domestic system that might vary according to the political
history and unique conditions of a people. Until the monopoly of coercive
force shifts from the nation-state to a supranational or global authority (a
transformation of power not likely to happen soon if ever), we should accept
64. Julius Stone, Visions of World Order: Between State Power and Human Justice (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 91-101.
65. See Butterfield, note 7 above, 50.
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CHRISTENSON
the reality of keeping world public order through national systems. 66 As a
matter of foreign policy, international agreements that are not enforceable
by reciprocal arrangements ought not be invoked to affect the behavior of
another country toward its own citizens.
If this summary fairly represents Kennan's conclusions as I have inter-
preted their application to human rights in foreign policy, are those conclu-
sions valid? Is Kennan at last to be heard? Are his views adequate in taking
account of the transformations in power relationships that appear to make
human rights concerns as strategic and important as nuclear weapons and
global ecology? Is Kennan's argument for a moral obligation for removing
the threat of nuclear or ecological disaster more cogent than one for amelio-
rating gross abuse of human dignity?
Prudence may indeed place high priority on the intractable problems of
major war and the environment, but what makes them any more of a moral
or political obligation upon governments than the protection of fundamental
human rights? The answer seems to lie in the construct Kennan brings to his
realistic understanding of the nation-state system. He writes frequently of the
relationship between responsibility or obligation and power.
Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, not everyone in this world is responsi-
ble, after all, for the actions of everyone else, everywhere. Without the power to
compel change, there is no responsibility for its absence. In the case of govern-
ments it is important for purely practical reasons that the lines of responsibility be
kept straight, and that there be, in particular, a clear association of the power to
act with the consequences of action or inaction.67
Power resides in the nation-states and the special power to control
nuclear weapons and environmental harm lies predominately with the great
powers. The power to control the behavior of individuals resides in the inter-
nal domestic systems of coercive order traditionally exercised by sovereign
states. One state cannot easily intervene in another state's internal relation-
ship of government to citizen (with or without justification in law or morality)
without a major claim to displace, weaken, or subordinate the authority
structure of that government. 68 states have no claim to authority or control
over the internal political independence or integrity of other states.69 They
may have sufficient power to intervene or to control, but in the calculus of
66. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1 above, 206.
67. Ibid., 212.
68. See Richard Lillich ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottes-
ville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1973) for a detailed exploration of the problem of
the legality of major power interferences in the international affairs of other states commit-
ting human rights offenses against their own populations even when such repressive ac-
tions shock the conscience or threaten the peace.
69. The principle of illegality for threats to a nation's territorial integrity or political in-
dependence is reflected in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Despite the purposes of the
Charter to promote human rights of all peoples, the Soviet-bloc have invoked consistently
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Kennan and Human Rights
cost and benefit, the costs are high and the claims to control may be quite in-
efficient. The principle of political independence and nonintervention en-
capsulate experience from the Peloponnesian wars to the Napoleonic wars
and the twentieth century wars. The costs may be high indeed when a for-
eign power seeks to intervene to control the internal affairs of another coun-
try, even when conquered or even when the intervention is by a major
power. Costs may be less when the local population is being repressed or
brutalized and the intervention is to counter the repression of a democratic
insurgency.70
In the cases of nuclear weapons and global ecology, however, (and
perhaps also ir, the global economy and communications) the planetary in-
terests transcend those of the nations and demand that state power be used
to eliminate the threats to all. States themselves have power to stop gross
abuses of human rights and improve conditions within their own borders,
but without the cooperation of other states they have no power to eliminate
the threats to all from major war and ecological destruction. As nuclear pro-
liferation and widespread ecological destruction threaten to escape the con-
trol of even the great powers, the interest of all in yielding to international
control heightens. The Hobbesian world of Leviathans coexisting in a natural
state of hostility is a precondition for yielding autonomy for survival and
order. Hume's notion that it is in a nation's interest for all other nations to
cooperate in keeping order, while it does not, describes the dilemma. If a
state has power, the capacity to defect from a cooperative standard of inter-
national order increases.7 1 This dilemma in contemporary theory of public
choice is well-known. 72 A nation has no narrow self-interested incentive to
cooperate when it has power, only when it needs the power of others.
Or is it rather that Kennan's structure, with circular logic, answers itself?
Governments ought not threaten each other's internal order in human rights
matters because it would be incompatible with the existing power of the
state and destabilizing of the equilibrium of existing power if an outside force
claimed a basic part of the allegiance and protection of local citizens. The
fear of internal changes and revolutions, allegedly encouraged by human
a narrow interpretation of Article 2(7), the domestic jurisdiction reservation, that any in-
ternational accountability for internal human rights compliance is an unwarranted in-
terference with their domestic affairs. See Jhabvala, note 48 above, 461, 490.
70. See Cutler, note 38 above, 96 (the principle of counter-intervention in support of
democratic movements or governments does not emasculate Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter).
71. Hume, note 51 above.
72. Russell Hardin summarizes and extends this dilemma, beginning with the well-used
"prisoner's dilemma" by using game theory in dynamic collective action. The incentive for
a participant to defect and not cooperate in collective action while presuming a free ride,
is the basis for the dilemma in the theoretical model. A major power's responsibility is not
to get trapped in the dilemma when survival is the issue. Russell Hardin, Collective Action
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 16-37.
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CHRISTENSON
rights pressures by a major power (as some claim happened in Iran and Nic-
aragua) loosens internal bonds of control, especially when the control was
maintained by repressive measures, and is likely to yield even more repres-
sive successor regimes.
One answer is to work within the power structure of nation-states, a
moral justification by rasion d'etat.73 Indeed, various external human rights
policies toward the Philippines tapped a nascent democratic revolution
whose strength toppled the Marcos regime. Something more powerful,
then, might be at work than can be attended exclusively within the internal
order system of each country without international meddling. The new
Reagan foreign policy, which uses human rights to justify support for
democratic insurgencies against repressive regimes from the right as well as
the left, revises earlier formulations. Recent experience in the Philippines,
Haiti, Chile, and South Africa presumably justifies the new revision and thus
supports aid to the contras in Nicaragua and insurgencies elsewhere.74 From
Kennan's premises, he would not formulate such a human rights policy, for
it may or may not serve the national interest, although it is clear that in any
given situation when required, Kennan would not hesitate to allow moral
sensibilities to coincide with national interest. Even though any intervention
required in the national interest, as in the Indian intervention in Bangladesh,
the American intervention in Grenada or the African countries' intervention
in Uganda, might be technically illegal (although all unilateral interventions
are wrapped in some form of legality such as self-defense), it might also be
considered moral.
It is not altogether clear that the same reasoning will not apply to
nuclear power and global ecology, too. Kennan's acceptance of a moral
obligation for a foreign policy of one category of dangers but not the other
seems rooted less in the capacity to use power than in the calculation of will
to use it effectively. Any moral obligation for Kennan derives from the duty
of the national government to use its resources for limited but vital objectives
to avert a threat to the whole, including its own people, and not to interfere
with other governments' internal relations with their own citizens. The cal-
culation seems one of cost-benefit, a utilitarian one, not a Kantian view of a
government's universal moral obligation to human beings at large, grounded
in an inner imperative applied to its own actions. It is entirely possible, how-
73. Butterfield's study of raison d'etat is similar to Kennan's and does not deserve the pejora-
tive connotation given to the term "statist." See Coil, note 8 above, 87-96.
74. New York Times, 15 March 1986, p. 4: "In this global revolution, there can be no doubt
where America stands. The American people believe in human rights and oppose tyranny
in whatever form, whether of the left or the right. We use our influence to encourage
democratic change, in careful ways that respect other countries' traditions and political
realities as well as the security threats that many of them face from external or internal
forces of totalitarianism." See a recent appraisal of the Reagan doctrine, in Rosenfeld, note
23 above.
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Kennan and Human Rights
ever, for a political calculus to show that it is indeed in the national interests
of the United States to use human rights abuses to justify influencing events
within another country even though there is neither a moral nor a legal
obligation to act. The danger, of course, is that such a policy can lead to
coercive intervention when authority structures weaken or change and the
national policy objectives widen to become counter-government.75
If there is no basis for a moral obligation for one government to hold
other governments accountable for their internal human rights practices,
even if the power is available, might there be a duty to act on the basis of
legal obligation? It is at this point in understanding Kennan that his associa-
tion of the moral with the legal deserves critical analysis. If Kennan, as he has
written, respects the sovereign equality of the nation-state tradition and insti-
tutions of international law, as well as specific, contractual obligations in
treaties, he must not also take the purely Austinian view that international
law is nothing but positive morality. Legal obligations may and do arise, by
consent, between governments. The institutions of international law he
75. The reality is that countries intervene for purely national or ideological reasons, as hap-
pened in the Spanish Civil War. Carr explains: "[T]he notion had grown up since the first
world war that a country whose internal organization was based on a certain political
theory was expected to encourage and assist the triumph of that theory in other countries.
This policy was pursued by the Soviet Union prior to 1927, and was adopted later by
other countries .... In nearly all such cases, it seems difficult to distinguish between the
supposed interests of a political theory and the national interests of the invervening coun-
try." Edward Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1919-1939 (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), 270.
The United Nations Charter sought to prevent just such major power interventions
through outlawing force by one state against another except for collective action and self-
defense. Various interventions initially have rested on humanitarian or protection of na-
tionals grounds but subsequently have changed rapidly to reflect broader, counter-
authority objectives, as in the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in
1965, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Congo intervention, the Indian inter-
vention in Bangladesh, and others. These trends formed the backdrop for the Charlottes-
ville conference of experts on the subject leading to skepticism about the doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention, but a concern for human rights deprivations in the face of United
Nations impotence. Lillich, note 68 above, containing essays by Professors Brownlie,
Farer, and Reisman.
The late Wolfgang Friedmann pointed out the difficulty in formulating any kind of prin-
ciples of international law on the subject of humanitarian intervention without authority
from the United Nations under collective security provisions. That inquiry inevitably
raised "fundamental questions of the structure of international law." Ibid., 36. He asked:
"Are we not then coming- openly or in disguise- to our own preferences? In other words,
we accept intervention for purposes that we regard as desirable because we dislike the
structure of the government in question?" Ibid. He postulated the possibility of a morally
valid but legally invalid intervention for humanitarian purposes exclusively, a grey and
developing area of international law, as in the Indian intervention in Bangladesh. Human-
itarian interventions by the United States in Grenada, Central America, and in terrorist
situations pose even more difficult questions of morality and law than addressed in the
conference in 1972. For a full treatment of the major instances of humanitarian interven-
tion before World War I, see Louis Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, International Protec-
tion of Human Rights (Indianapblis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 137-194.
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CHRISTENSON
respects are those of a structural or constitutive character, not those of a set
of norms in a cosmopolitan sense where the individual has a direct relation
with the international community bypassing the social contract of nations
with citizens for allegiance and protection. 76 But they are international law
norms nonetheless.
For Kennan, I believe, legal obligation among governments would arise
from customs, traditions, and agreements reciprocally followed by states in
their mutual relations. This international law is referred to by Hart as the set
of primary rules of obligation among nations. But there is no unifying power
by which they are changed, invalidated, or recognized as legitimate, as there
is in advanced municipal systems. Secondary rules of recognition, often
spelled out in constitutions, provide this unifying and validating function.
The validating rules in various countries recognize the legitimacy of particu-
lar primary rules that develop from within. In the international system, we
have only the most rudimentary worldwide process for validating or chang-
ing customs and traditions among nations. Hart thinks we may be working
also toward a more unified international system by similar secondary norms
of recognition as yet undeveloped. My guess is that Kennan would not think
this development realistic, but that he would accept as workable the few im-
portant rules of reciprocal custom and agreement that are effective. He
would not think it necessary to have a super-system for changing the rules
about jurisdiction, territory, international agreements, or respect for the
political independence of other states. He might characterize such attempts
as avoiding complex substantive problems.
Others believe Hart's analytic structure is not realistic enough. 77 Either
way, primary rules among nations are community expectations we label
obligations. They do not require for their effectiveness a formal process to
tell us which rules are valid.78 When a structural (or functional) unity is re-
quired by cooperation to solve certain intractable problems, however, a sec-
ond set of constitutive norms or principles may become necessary.
Kennan would accept a primary imperative to refrain from intervention
or coercion against the territorial integrity or political independence of
76. See Hoffmann, note 35 above, 36-37, for a thesis employing the cosmopolitan approach
to a limited transformation of the structure of international relations.
77. McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman view this concept as inadequate. "The analytical ap-
proach has been too much obsessed by a sterile notion of law as a body of rules
emanating from some internal 'sovereign' source to observe any wider context of social
processes, much less a world constitutive process; its more recent assumption of certain
ill-defined 'secondary' rules which mysteriously bestow 'validity' upon 'primary' rules of-
fers but a modest expansion of view." "The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative
Decision," revised and reprinted in Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, Interna-
tional Law Essays (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1981), 191, 199.
78. Hart, note 15 above, 97, 228-231. "[A] society may live by rules imposing obligations on
its members as 'binding,' even though they are regarded simply as a set of separate rules,
not unified by or deriving their validity from any more basic rule. It is plain that the mere
existence of rules does not involve the existence of such a basic rule." Ibid., 228.
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Kennan and Human Rights
another country, subject to traditional self-defense. The purpose of this
obligation would be to preserve the constitution of the power of the nation-
state system for recognizing and enforcing rules within the municipal
system. If the character of the international legal obligation changes to affect
primary or secondary norms of national systems, as in the specification of
the civil, political, social, and economic rights and duties of human beings
and their governments, then Kennan becomes skeptical, for it may be neces-
sary for a nation to act for its own interests at variance from such claims in
specific cases. But these matters are best left to the culturally diverse, inter-
nal processes of governments, in the absence of a stronger international
system.
Kennan accepts the statist position, not as an absolutist, but rather for
the largely practical reason of the need to exercise power to provide order in
a decentralized, relativist world. Moreover, even the present rules of inter-
national law are far too vague and have far too little agreement about their
meaning to allow the interpretations of one government to be given prefer-
ence through its foreign policy insistence on accountability by another for
detection and correction of internal abuse.
79
Now suppose, as consensus suggests, that certain of the various human
rights are considered fundamental and have compelling importance in state
practice by universal agreement. Not only are they obligatory on all govern-
ments under positive international law, erga omnes,80 but also they may
have the character of jus cogens.1l These kinds of norms have a peremptory
quality under customary international law that permits no derogation by any
state. 82 Should not these "intensities in demand" amount to legal obligations
of such an overriding affirmative character that national governments acting
on behalf of the entire international community must enforce these norms
for the benefit of individuals even if not in the immediate political interest of
the nation through its foreign policy?8 3 As in the Draft Restatement of
79. Even if we accept the validating procedure entailed by the emergence of secondary rules
of recognition, as D'Amato points out, an adequate concept of law requires the justifica-
tion of content in addition to the test of pedigree to deal with the inability of the positivists
to handle the moral questions once morality and law are separated. See Anthony
D'Amato, "The Moral Dilemma of Positivism," Valparaiso University Law Review 21
(1985): 43.
80. Flowing to all.
81. Compelling law.
82. Brownlie, note 15 above, 512-515.
83. Ibid. at 224-225. See Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)
(Tent. Draft No. 6, Vol. 1, 12 April 1985) Sec. 702 and comment 1 and m; Myres S.
McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and Lung Chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 338-350 (insisting on jus cogens in a com-
prehensive global constitution, based on the social facts of intensities of demand). But
how does this latter view of the peremptory norms differ conceptually from Hart's second-
ary rules of recognition?
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Foreign Relations Law of the United States 84 or in recent recommendations
for inclusion as part of foreign policy, the most basic general obligation
would be "to halt the suffering caused by torture, detentions, extra-judicial
executions and starvation."I s
I think it is possible for Kennan to accept a legal obligation, narrowly
constructed from positive international law, without associating it necessar-
ily with a moral obligation of governments. He could be consistent by view-
ing such a legal obligation conceptually not as a claim to change the struc-
ture of the international order through unilateral enforcement by one
government acting as international agent in the internal affairs of another,
but as an affirmative duty to cooperate with all other states to ensure that
their governments implement these general obligations internally. But that
obligation is precisely what most governments have already agreed to and
what Kennan finds meaningless. Putting aside the regional and international
institutions for enforcing the human rights conventions, and even distin-
guishing between intervention and interference, might nations act as agents
to enforce human rights of other countries' nationals on behalf of the inter-
national community? Is it possible to go beyond the legal obligation affecting
primary norms among governments without directly challenging the struc-
ture of the present system of nation-states which Kennan has accepted by his
initial realistic premises?
Kennan does challenge the present structure by his affirmative impera-
tives to eliminate the threats of major war and of ecological destruction even
if his narrowest change has a strategic or functional focus. Moreover, as in
the Nuremberg Principles, individuals acting under state orders preventing
the performance of a specific obligation against nuclear proliferation or use
or against ecological degradation may have direct duties running to interna-
tional law which may not be excused by superior orders. Unless Kennan ad-
mits the defeat of the dilemma that a nation's own self-interest permits it to
defect from such norms, but not to permit any other nation to defect, then
he must find some way to enforce directly the important obligations of inter-
national law between the nation and its officials in conduct toward its
citizens and toward other nations. A functional international regime may be
the only feasible alternative, a structural change anticipated by Kennan him-
self years ago, in the Baruch and other plans. Transition to such a regime
would require yielding a piece of the statist assumptions Kennan makes.
While I have no doubt that Kennan reached his conclusions about the
twin perils for practical and prudent reasons of policy, the structure that im-
84. Restatement, note 83 above. Section 702 lists genocide, slavery or slave trade, state
murder or disappearance of individuals, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic
racial discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, as violations of customary international law if a state by its
policy practices, encourages, or condones any of them.
85. Matthews and Pratt, note 33 above.
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Kennan and Human Rights
plicitly undergirds his thinking is not capable, without modification, of
achieving his main moral concerns. His thinking about human rights, based
as it is on a rejection of his own projections of the evils of a "legalistic-moral-
istic" approach to foreign policy, explains why his own realism may be
trapped in structural contradiction. Kennan's own assumptions about the
nation-state system also rest on certain conceptions of law and morality, but
he seems to avoid the demystification of these assumptions. Moreover, these
assumptions may not describe actual patterns of authority and effective con-
trol from within the international community. For example, judicial power is
one of the little-noticed parts of Austin's definition of law that gives meaning
to Kennan's realism when applied to international human rights. I refer to
the meaning of political superiority, when human rights demands take politi-
cal form from within a state and are given recognition by courts. In addition,
claims made powerful by people, compelling interests and, today, interna-
tional movements from multinational corporations, international organiza-
tions, and covert or terrorist organizations have to enter any realistic ap-
praisal of interests and power, as McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman explain
in their comprehensive jurisprudence and as Julius Stone summarizes in his
last work.
86
Kennan's near statist view of the legitimacy of the power of the
sovereign state does not square with his own political realism when one
observes the power of the demands for human rights against abuses by
brutal governments. In the subordination of human rights theory to that of
the old social contract basis of the nation-state, traditional political realism
itself may shun facing the political power claims from within the state. In the
same way that Kennan recognized the advanced power of the American
judiciary under an updated Hobbesian version of protection, so also political
reality of unmet demands of people ready to be organized into formal power
claims cannot be ignored.87 These claims are as real, although the political
86. Lasswell, McDougal, and Reisman, note 77 above; Stone, note 64 above.
87. Note the political use of human rights from a purely national interest perspective in
tapping the demands from within a nation such as Chile. Career diplomat Harry G.
Barnes, Jr., Ambassador to Chile from the United States, uses the human rights organiza-
tions and moderate opposition to President Pinochet's government to support a transition
to democracy. The General has publicly stated, in opposition, that the "function of some
diplomats" was not to act as "correctors," for that would mean leaving behind "the
minimum norms of good relations." Yet, the apparent reality is one of capturing the
political spirit of the people for the foreign policy objective of preventing more radical fac-
tions to benefit from the government's intransigence. New York Times, 27 January 1986,
p. 6. A New York Times editorial was quick to discern this kind of shift in the human rights
policy of the United States in Haiti and the Philippines, noting "the Administration's
roundabout return to an even-handed human rights policy. After an initial coddling of
'friendly authoritarians' and South Africa's racist regime, it now champions American
values on a wide front. The effect, if not the motive, is also to enhance respect for
America's hostility to leftist tyrannies." Editorial, "Mr. Reagan Scores for Democracy," New
York Times, 8 February 1986, p. 18.
This editorial rhetoric is indeed the object of Mr. Kennan's criticism. It illustrates the
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CHRISTENSON
channels are not as well-defined, as those protected in Western democra-
cies through the courts or parliament.
I have reached my critical conclusion about Kennan's association of
morality and human rights law most cautiously and gingerly, for the lucidity
and integrity of Kennan's voice heard over the decades so vastly outclasses
that of his detractors or of those he aptly calls the moral meddlers, that to risk
this conclusion may weaken his own critique. Kennan should be applauded
for revealing the concealed avoidance of substantive conflict in thinking that
moral or legal codes can determine outcomes. This kind of critique, how-
ever, is now more than ever needed to show that even the structural as-
sumptions Kennan relies upon in this contemporary era-the fictional social
compact based on natural law duties between citizens and governments,88
the presumed exclusivity of the nation-state in the international power struc-
ture, the predilection for preserving that structure89 and the implications of
his statist realism - all require a more thoughtful and penetrating inquiry. The
human rights side of the obligations of foreign policy places restraints and af-
firmative duties on governments in relation to their citizens. Challenges to
the legitimacy of the state from unauthorized minor coercion (we call it the
international terrorist phenomenon), the other side of the problem, repre-
sent coercive claims to power. The one structurally may be related to the
other, for a weakened state cannot protect its citizens' rights. Ultimately
strengthening the power of the state in repressing unauthorized coercion by
potentially equally repressive measures of state violence may also lead to
human rights deprivations and a denial that things might be transformed into
a more civilized world. The paradox may simply reinforce Kennan's own
sense of the human condition as tragic.
confusion that easily leads to realists to resist a human rights policy, for the purpose of
human rights in foreign policy is not necessarily to champion American values, an
egocentric idea of detection and correction, but to act as an agent of the international
community using a few well-established principles of international law as well as the na-
tional self-interest. Whether the Reagan administration's revision of foreign policy in
regional security adequately enfolds human rights concerns when repressive regimes of
both the right and the left are involved is not clear, nor does it necessarily address
Kennan's main points. While even-handed and high-toned, it does contain language of
realism and national interests based on appraisal of another country's own traditions; but
it seems to rest on a Wilsonian vision of democratic revolutions encouraged by a politi-
cized human rights foreign policy. See "Presidential Message to Congress," note 34 above.
88. In his "Yencken hypothesis" Falk stated that a contractual relationship between a people
and its government at the level of nation-state cannot be sustained without the use of
repressive force so long as the territorial nation-state system continues. For consensual
rule under social contract at that level, it is necessary at the same time to have a social
contract on a global level, as a prelude to a transition to nonterritorial central guidance
functions and redistribution of power, wealth, and influence. Richard Falk, A Study of
Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975). For a critique, see Stone, note 64 above, 13,
33-40.
89. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," note 1 above, 206. Kennan once told the student
left that he was far more radical than they, for he wanted structural changes to be made in
government. Kennan, note 9 above, 204, 228.
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Kennan and Human Rights
Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell were the first to propose a com-
prehensive jurisprudence of human dignity attempting to accommodate
power, authority, values, and decisions and looking toward a different future
world process. Conceptions of many other thoughtful international lawyers
struggling within a contemporary society not burdened by the impediments
of "legalistic-moralistic" assumptions have come to share many of Kennan's
conclusions. Yet, without fail, these distinguished international lawyers, dis-
agreeing as they might with each other and on their assumptions, have
placed the problem of human dignity and fundamental human rights near
the top of their concerns, along with the control of violence and nuclear
weapons, the problems of economic development, and the concern about
environmental degradation.
It is the task for jurisprudence to try to explain where we are headed or
ought to be. It is clear that change is rapidly affecting how we see, concep-
tualize, and act. The structures of international order are inadequate for the
present and have not yet yielded a future, and we are skeptical of throwing
them out. Yet we need these institutions, without illusion, without the con-
cealed assumptions that Kennan's realism so long ago revealed and that his
own structure now employs with great conceptual difficulty.
HeinOnline  -- 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 373 1986
ennan and  t  373 
r s ugal  l  l re t  fir t t   -
i  j ri r ence  an i ity tt ting  ate 
l  i i   l i   iff r nt f t  
rld . ti  f  t er tf l ti l l  
li it in  t r r  i t  t r d  t  i i t  
f li tic- oralistic" ti    r  y f 's 
t i ti i  l l r , i
i   t it      ti ,  
l   r le  f n   l  i t  r 
t    l  ith  l f i l l r 
t  l   i  l t   ut 
i t l ti . 
  f r     r 
      ,
t t r   i l  t   
t t    ti l f t r i  
 t i i t 
i i  
    
